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Within feminist theory, special attention has often 
been paid to the discursive space required for 
women to effectively participate in the interpretive 
processes of culture without having to perform 
great feats of linguistic and psychic dexterity. 
Historically, the call to alter, enlarge, and transform 
this space has centered on the awareness that 
performing such tasks, while allowing women to 
engage in public dialogue and moral deliberation 
through a determinate location of their voice 
within preexisting social norms, typically comes at 
the expense of radical differences and complex 
intersections of multiple categories of self-
identification (including those of race, sex, gender, 
class and ethnicity). Under such a bind, North 
American feminists have developed critical tools of 
analysis such as “double-edged thinking” to 
address the problem of mobilizing projects of 
emancipation against a historical backdrop that is 
still deeply embedded with masculine narratives, 
texts, and practices, and which may include the 
very terms emancipatory projects supply (Butler, 
129). In Latin America, given the context of 
European colonialism, feminist inquiry not only 
faces this bind (insofar as in order to decolonize, 
one is burdened with the task of mobilizing 
projects of liberation against colonial thinking 
using the very colonial epistemology which 
originally constrained one), but is further stamped 
by cultural and historical differences that invariably 
shape the epistemic location of women’s voices, 
but which often go unacknowledged in 
transnational contexts.  
 
The powerful legacies of colonialism and imperial 
rule, along with the specific conditions of rampant 
poverty, uneven development under neoliberal 
globalization, compulsory motherhood, 
militarization of border regions, rural and linguistic 
marginalization, social violence and the stratified 
division of labor all serve as a backdrop against 
which the traditional interpretive foci of race, sex, 
gender, class and ethnicity prove insufficient as 
analytical categories in Latin American feminisms. 
By working through some contemporary examples 
involving the de-legitimization of indigenous 
women’s epistemic authority to tell their own 
narratives, I want to address how in Latin America, 
philosophical problems—like the problem of 
language and its capacity to describe experience— 
emerge in ways that are different from the global 
North due to the impact of colonialism on 
Amerindian conceptual frameworks and linguistic 
systems. Theorizing harms through the interpretive 
lens of categories like gender is thus not enough to 
attend to the complexities of women’s concrete 
experiences of suffering and oppression in the 
region and to decode the imprint of neocolonial 
violence on their lives. 
 
In discussing these issues, it is not my intention to 
erect a false binary between Latin American and 
Anglophone feminisms, or to suggest that 
analytical categories like ‘gender’ have not served 
important roles in framing issues in twentieth-
century Latin American and Caribbean feminisms, 
especially in such a way as to promote 
transnational dialogue and build advocacy 
coalitions over shared concerns. Indeed, feminisms 
vary widely within local and national contexts and 
are active sites of internal dialogue, negotiation and 
contestation. Articulating their full complexity, 
even within Latin American philosophical 
feminisms alone, is well beyond the scope of this 
essay. Rather, what I want to focus on here is the 
extent to which the context-dependent strategies and 
methodologies that have developed in response to 
women’s situated experiences with oppression—
which include feminist theories of ‘hybridity,’ 
‘mental nepantilism,’ ‘transtextuality,’ and ‘world-
traveling,’ among many others—have been 
consistently subsumed under (or marginalized 
within) more mainstream transnational and 
Anglophone categories of knowledge that 
developed in response very different socio-
historical conditions, and which may not be 
maximally equipped to deal with issues unique to 
post-colonial Latin American, borderland identities, 
or even those of Latinas in  the United States (Ruíz 
2010).  
 
Take the category of ‘gender’, for instance, which 
has no exact correlate in Spanish. Género, as it has 
come to be translated, is a classificatory noun 
derived from the Latin generis that designates kind 
or type (as in ‘mankind’), and only in grammatical 
contexts was it used to refer to the masculinity or 
femininity of a noun (thus internally reproducing 
heterosexual dualisms). Although the organizing 
rubric of gender has been important for building 
transborder links with North American and global 
feminisms and, in many cases, reworked to fit 
specific local contexts, historically, its importation 
into Latin America in the 1990s was met with deep 
concerns about its depoliticizing effect on women’s 
struggles. In fact, as Claudia de Lima Costa 
recounts, “states and inter-governmental agencies 
unabashedly embraced gender” as a way of 
promoting “gender equity” in public policies and 
programs, thus resulting (among other things) in 
the proliferation of masculinity studies programs as 
a time when women’s studies programs were 
severely underfunded or altogether lacking (173). 
By contrast, in Argentina, where state-sponsored 
terrorism against women was institutionalized 
through military impunity from rape and the forced 
disappearance of minor children, mothers of 
disappeared children organized around the 
traditional (some would argue, essentialist) concept 
of maternity and the Catholic deification of 
motherhood to establish political subjectivities that 
could attain some level of audibility and protection 
under state terrorism. But the trajectory of feminist 
inquiry and activism under conditions of human 
rights abuses and political repression in Latin 
America itself requires further contextualization, as 
the emergence of state-sponsored violence in Latin 
America can be traced back to the volatile shaping 
and reshaping of autochthonous political traditions 
following European colonization of the region.  
To be clear, the question here is not whether 
gender can be a powerful and useful interpretive 
lens across a broad range of issues in Latin 
American feminist inquiry—it certainly has been 
instrumental in orchestrating conceptual strategies 
against state and religious attempts to reproduce 
normative family structures that condemn 
homosexuality through biologically reductive 
conceptions of sex (174). Moreover, there is a 
difference between the reception of these 
categories in Latin America and within Latina 
feminisms operating within the United States, 
particularly as they have been appropriated by 
women of color and U.S. third-world feminisms. 
For example, writing from the experience of the 
U.S.-Mexico borderland (both geographically and 
epistemically), Gloria Anzaldúa maintains that “for 
a people who cannot identify with either standard” 
of linguistic and cultural norms (i.e., the Anglo or 
the Spanish), but who are caught in both worlds, 
what is needed is a critical reworking of these 
categories to account for the multiplicity of harms 
and vulnerabilities complex identities face (1987, 
77). She writes: “Necesitamos teorías that will 
rewrite history using race, class, gender and 
ethnicity as categories of analysis, theories that 
cross borders, blur boundaries” (1990, xxvv).  
 
Thus, despite these points of complementarity, the 
larger worry here is that what tends to get lost in 
the all-too-often unilateral flow of ideas (or 
transnational commerce of ‘theories’) is the 
creative efforts by Latin American feminists to 
deploy, for instance, strategic and tactical 
deployments of maternity—even to reify it in 
parodic ways— so as to address specific harms and 
context-dependent struggles. In “The Coloniality 
of Gender,” Maria Lugones makes an even 
stronger case for the historical situatedness of our 
interpretive categories, arguing that the “modern 
colonial gender system” is itself not native to 
Mesoamerica and introduced a whole host of 
power differentials and biases that must be 
accounted for in order to robustly theorize and 
enact women’s coalitional agency against 
“systematic racialized gender violence” (16). 
Considerations of race— a hallmark of 
philosophical feminisms in Latin America— are 
thus equally important, but also layered with 
cultural conceptions of racial mixture and 
miscegenation rooted in the region’s multifaceted 
experience with colonialism. It is out of this 
context that the key interpretive categories of 
hybridity and mestizaje arose to address issues of 
‘race,’ but which often go unnoticed in North 
American philosophical discussions of race and 
ethnicity.  
 
Henceforth, despite substantial cultural and 
historical differences, the methodological 
perspectives and regulative concepts used to 
analyze issues that specifically concern women’s 
lives in Latin America and border regions have, by 
and large, been unsuccessful in being marshaled 
into disciplinary discourses that provide, among 
other things, institutional support for the mapping 
and dissemination of ideas, the development of 
specialized vocabularies, and the organization of 
professional conferences. This is especially true 
with regard to philosophical feminisms in Latin 
American (Schutte 2011).  
 
At a time when designating Latin American 
philosophy as a distinct field of inquiry within 
academic philosophy is still plagued by serious 
difficulties, articulating the disciplinary outlines of 
Latin American feminist philosophy may seem to be 
a doubly daunting task. Indeed, some of the same 
typologic questions about the term exist: namely, 
whether what is being designated is feminist 
inquiry in Latin America that is philosophical in 
nature or engages ‘traditional’ philosophic 
concerns; whether it is philosophy done by Latin 
American women or those that speak to issues 
pertinent to Latin American women and the 
historical vulnerabilities they face; whether it is the 
deployment of theoretical correctives to Latin 
American philosophy or traditional narratives in 
the history of philosophy by Latin American 
women or feminist voices located in Latin America 
(or whose epistemic position is Latin America but 
write abroad)—these are all ways of delimiting (in 
the narrow sense) the robustness and complexity 
of the filed.  A better approach is to syncretize, 
strand by strand, collective concerns and 
methodological approaches that can be braided 
together to create a shared vision while respecting 
internal differences and resisting unilateral 
interpolation of women’s diverse needs and voices 
through, for example, academic feminisms or 
professional philosophy. It is for this reason that I 
interlace (but try not to conflate) discourses drawn 
from Latina Feminisms and Latin American 
feminist theory into discussions of philosophical 
feminisms in Latin America as part of a broader, 
pluralist practice.   
 
In fact, philosophy may not even be a suitable 
home for Latin American philosophical feminisms. 
As Ofelia Schutte has argued, “no es fácil para las 
mujeres incorporar el pensamiento feminista 
dentro de la filosofía proque la filosofia como 
discurso académico ha sido elaborada 
principalmente por hombres y está centrada en un 
mundo masculino a lo largo de la historia” 
(Walczak, 6).  Even the field of Latin American 
Thought (pensamiento latinoamericano) and the various 
liberation epistemologies it is home to may not 
suffice, since they too are prey to universal 
conceptions of victimhood inattentive to women’s 
specific experience of social violence and harms 
(Schutte 2011).  For instance, when we look closely 
at Latin American revolutionary discourses we 
notice that, in the wake of colonialism, social 
theorists attempting to develop a critical counter-
text that advances social liberation have often 
slipped into constructions of social reality as 
homogenous and authentic; this is particularly 
evident in regulative concept of ‘the people’ in the 
Catholic-Marxist theology of liberation or in anti-
imperialist movements. Under this rubric, women’s 
bodies and experiences of oppression are excluded 
from engaging equally in a collective interpretive 
process within culture that addresses urgent 
problems of marginalization, servitude, violence, 
and patriarchy. In fact, 20th century Latin 
American revolutionary discourses often 
functioned through the implicit subordination of 
women’s voices to the collective aim of the 
revolutionary vanguard, and by deferring their 
material interests to those of ‘el pueblo’.   
 
Despite this absence of a disciplinary home, very 
broadly speaking, we can say that philosophical 
feminisms in Latin America have their roots in 
forms of analysis that arose in response to the 
colonial imposition of European conceptual 
orthodoxies in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
as colonialism imposed a new system of gender 
binaries and restrictions that differ significantly 
form pre-Columbian conceptions of sex and 
gender. The juridical and social institutions built to 
manage, regulate, and perpetuate those restrictions 
resulted in civil codes and municipal regulations 
that severely restricted women’s access to, for 
example, education (most notably literacy), divorce, 
reproductive autonomy or voluntary motherhood. 
Because philosophical feminisms arose to critically 
address these lived concerns, they are 
fundamentally bound up with forms of feminist 
inquiry that see women’s liberation from 
oppression through participatory approaches to 
emancipation (rather than as abstract pursuits).  
And yet, although as Amy Oliver notes, 
“autochthonous feminist thought has existed in 
Latin America for centuries,” dating back to the 
writings of Sor Juana Inéz de la Cruz (1651-1695), 
philosophical feminisms did not actually begin to 
emerge in a significant way until socio-political 
conditions in the mid to late twentieth century 
precipitated the need to urgently address human 
rights emergencies (31). They are thus historically 
responsive to the movements of liberation that 
swept the subcontinent following the 1959 Cuban 
revolution, including the quickly developing 
movimiento de mujeres in the 1980s (Alvarez, 541). In 
fact, it was not until 1979 that the first panel on 
feminism was held at a national philosophy 
congress in Latin America, organized by the late 
Mexican feminist philosopher, Graciela Hierro 
(1928-2003) (Schutte and Femenías, 401).  Even 
with this precedent over 30 years ago, to date, the 
journal Hiparquia (1988-99) has been the only 
journal devoted to feminist philosophy in Latin 
America (Ibid). Given this history, part of 
understanding the many difficulties involved in 
developing a distinct identity for Latin American 
philosophical feminisms today has to involve a 
deeper appreciation for the socio-historical 
situatedness of philosophical practice in general, 
and how such contexts tend to be covered-over in 
transnational (especially North-South) contexts.  
 
As a way of extending this claim to women’s 
epistemic authority in Latin America and the 
distinct difficulties women can face as speakers, we 
should note that one of the greatest impacts of 
European colonization in Latin America has been 
the closing off of discursive alternatives in culture, as 
well as the inability to give voice to contradictory 
experiences resulting from the loss of prior cultural 
contexts. The tendency to see speech acts as 
graphematic, for example, foreclosed the 
articulative range and potential of the Andean 
quippus, the Navajo blanket, as well the narrative 
mode of performance-based history, as in the 
Sinaloan Danza del Venado. For historically 
marginalized and subaltern peoples like indigenous 
women in Latin America, this has had serious 
ramifications that often go unacknowledged, 
especially in North-South dialogue. Telling a 
narrative marked by apparent discontinuities and 
contradictions (from the standpoint of Western 
discursive norms and rationality), for instance, can 
potentially de-legitimize a claimant’s voice in 
advance of the cultural particularities that bear 
directly on one’s ability to speak.  
 
Take the case of Rigoberta Menchú. In 1983 the 
K’iche’ Mayan woman attempted to bring attention 
to the massacre of over 200,000 Maya Indians at 
the hands of the Guatemalan Armed Forces by 
giving a testimonial account (testimonio) of her 
experiences to an ethnologist. David Stoll, an 
American anthropologist, responded to the 
subsequent publication of Menchú’s oral narrative 
by questioning the veracity of her claims. Using a 
model of speech acts based on a correspondence 
theory of truth, he cast doubt on the legitimacy of 
her narrative by pointing to apparent 
contradictions in the names and ages of her 
deceased family members, including the manner of 
death. While Stoll claimed his intent was not to 
challenge the primacy of larger claims to genocide 
by the K’iche’ community, the debate stirred up 
enough controversy as to usurp the urgency of 
Menchú’s plea for intervention and instead 
disseminated her narrative within the broader 
academic discourses of the ‘culture wars’ that were 
emerging in the 1980s.  
If we look to some of the Western conceptual 
biases inflected into Amerindian cultural traditions 
through colonialism—as in the assumption that 
history is a linear narrative based on logographic 
recording methods (which privilege literacy)— we 
find that the speaking positions of modern K’iche’ 
are always interwoven, pre-predicatively, with a 
cultural history marked by relations of power and 
domination, and which become visible each time 
the Western observer’s claim to finding ‘textual 
distortions’ in K’iche’ narrative texts arises. Against 
this view of cultural difference and alterity, one 
argument commonly emerges which points to pre-
Hispanic Mayan codices (hieroglyph scripts) as 
sharing many of the same conventions typically 
associated with ‘Western’ historiography; while 
recent scholarship may show these scripts as meant 
to be sung rather than ‘read’ (a practice which 
presupposes the interiorization of consciousness), 
by all accounts they seem to enumerate a coherent, 
meaningful continuity of politically-significant 
events, including the successive names of rulers, 
priestly casts and local rights of administration, etc. 
In turn, scholars like Stoll have deduced from this 
Mesoamerican history a more general, cross-
cultural standard of rationality assumed to exist 
below the level of culture, and which can be steadfastly 
applied to the formal study of objects in empirical 
research, including ethnography. Yet paradoxically, 
this argument only reinforces the existence of 
cultural difference, historical alterity and cross-
cultural misrecognition in the Latin American 
context. We know, for example, that in 
Mesoamerican K’iche’ society there existed an 
influential priestly scholarly community known as 
the aj tz’ibab (or aj tz’ib, as in ‘painter’ or ‘scribe’). 
Because the aj tz’ibab sustained Mayan religious 
practice through the composition and 
interpretation of calendars, Spanish conquerors 
quickly moved to eradicate both the religious 
calendars and their perceived ‘authors’ (Carmack, 
17). The violent extermination of the aj tz’ibab is 
significant to the de-legitimization of Menchú’s 
narrative almost 500 years later, since, as George 
Lovell and Christopher Lutz point out, “once the 
practice of training ‘historians’ was curtailed—it 
was a Kaqchikel [Menchú’s tribe] custom also, we 
should note—the loss must have had a serious 
impact on how …[Maya] oral tradition was passed 
down through the generations” (171). Thus, the 
development of certain oral-poetic, mnemonic 
features in K’iche’ narrative practice after the 
conquest (specifically, in Menchú’s testimony) 
owes much to the fact that, while Spanish 
conquerors violently forced a functional change in 
sign-systems onto Amerindian linguistic 
communities, they simultaneously excluded those 
communities from practices (such as literacy) that 
would allow them to engage collectively in the 
interpretive processes of culture. This is especially 
important with regard to women (and particularly 
rural, indigenous women) as they have historically 
lacked access to formal education and suffer the 
highest rates of illiteracy.   
 
In light of this example, we see how, when a 
modern K’iche’ woman goes to speak or make 
claims on behalf of her community, relations of 
power and domination already shape her enunciative 
attempts: her very language and narrative practices 
are a product of this history of domination. What 
this example does not address, however, is that 
problems of social violence in Latin America often 
involve multiple oppressions marked by complex 
intersections of racial, sexual, and linguistic 
vulnerabilities, but which may not be readily articulable at 
the level of official culture. That is to say, in a culturally 
asymmetrical speaking situation, indigenous 
women’s voices may be put under erasure in ways 
that cannot be easily accounted for through 
traditional frameworks of understanding social 
oppression or the intersections of multiple 
oppressions. Consequently, solutions and collective 
practices for social change may emerge which, 
because they do not speak to or address these 
complex issues, prove ineffective or, in the long 
run, reify neo-colonial practices of exclusion, 
especially towards indigenous women and other 
marginalized groups in Latin America. Part of the 
answer, then, involves increased attentiveness to 
both the powerful asymmetries that exist between 
differently situated speakers in culture as well as to 
how those differences are shaped by history.  
 
In this regard, the complicity between Eurocentric 
conceptual and linguistic frameworks and neo-
colonial practices can be deepened if we look at the 
problem of meaning formation from a hermeneutic 
perspective. Within a hermeneutic view of language, 
meaning is framed in terms of one’s tacit familiarity 
with a shared interpretative framework made up of 
the discursive acts, practices, and institutions of a 
particular life-world. This framework makes it 
possible for us to understand things, and we 
understand because we grow into a world where 
the things in question already ‘make sense.’ In the 
original encounter with Mayan culture, for example, 
the lack of a ‘shared framework’ compelled the 
colonial observer to misinterpret the Mayan way of 
making sense of things. The narrative logic of 
Mayan language, if and in what way it would have 
been conceived by the Mayans, was not 
communicable to the first colonial observers 
because, for one thing, Mayan hieroglyphics lacked 
a visible metric of translatability (perhaps a linear 
alphabet) for the Spaniards to see it as a narrative 
logic in the first place, much less as what Mayans 
actually purported the codices to say. However, 
this misrecognition of meaning can have serious 
modern-day ramifications, especially when 
culturally privileged agents who have access to the 
writing instruments of official history (as Michel de 
Certeau would put it) enact it.  
 
To explain this issue, the cultural anthropologist 
Quetzil Castañeda has cited the cartographic 
naming of the Yucatán peninsular region as a 
prime example of cross-cultural misrecognition, 
but one with deep significance for the 
configuration of postcolonial power relations in 
Latin America. He writes that “the discourse on 
the naming of the Yucatán has become a topos not 
only of Yucatán but of Latin American colonial 
discourse criticism, since it economically marks the 
complex textual inversion of alterity forged in the encounter 
between European and Indian” (23, emphasis added). 
The story of the naming of the Yucatan, he 
contends, constituted an arbitrary (because it was 
not seen by the Spaniards as arbitrary, but as 
universal truth) imposition of the Spaniard’s 
interpretative horizon on Amerindian landscapes. 
He reproduces Tzvetan Todorov’s congruent claim 
that “when the Spaniards discovered this land, their 
leader asked the Indians how it was called; as they 
did not understand him, they said uuyik a t’aan, 
which means, ‘what do you say’ or ‘what do you 
speak’, that ‘we do not understand you’. And then 
the Spaniard ordered it set down that it be called 
Yucatan…” (27). Told in a slight variation, 
Castañeda writes: 
 
When the Spaniards landed—landed on this ‘tierra 
del faisán y venado’ this ‘land of pheasant and 
deer’—the Indians called it ‘u luum cutz, u luum ceh’; 
and, when they met the natives who approached, they 
asked, ‘what is the name of this land?’ Not 
understanding k’astrant’aan (i.e. Spanish), one Mayan 
turned to the other and exclaimed,“Uuy ku t’aan!’ 
[Listen how they talk!] (28). 
 
As a major outcome of this forceful 
misappropriation of Mayan linguistic expressions, 
modern Mayans have had to re-make intelligible their 
own world back from colonial (mis)translations. Moreover, 
the Herculean task of unconcealing the resources 
of expression covered over by colonialism is 
particularly difficult for Mayans because current 
expressions—such as the widespread popular use 
of Yucatán to designate an ancestral Mayan 
dwelling place rather than the original “we do not 
understand you”—have been normativized by 
official representations of colonial history as 
foundational facts: namings vested by the 
Spaniard’s powerful claims of authority to be 
subsequently certified into timeless, encyclopedic 
form. The problem, of course, is that discursive 
frameworks always carry with them an 
unacknowledged background of assumptions that 
become settled and calcified in culture, especially 
through normative social practices and 
language. 
 
Historical insights such as these have led the 
Chilean feminist and cultural critic Nelly Richard to 
contend that “the Latin American context is 
characterized by the fact that the mechanisms of 
oppression and repression are always multiple 
(colonialist, neoimperialist, militaristic, and 
patriarchal, multicapitalist, etc.),” but multiple, one 
should add, in a way that fundamentally differs 
from the structures of oppression and 
subordination generally theorized by Anglophone 
and North American feminisms (286). The added 
consideration here is not only the history of 
European colonialism, but colonialism’s impact on 
the subsequent formation of the structures of 
oppression that affect women’s lives, including the 
material contexts of poverty and widespread 
discrimination. This extends to theorizing the 
intersectionality of oppressions based on categories 
like gender, as the continuation of neocolonial and 
neoimperial conditions necessitate further 
considerations of how the historicality of 
oppression bears on those intersections, particularly in 
such a way as to render them subaudible under 
certain categories of knowledge.  
 
It must be said, of course, that the lacunae and 
gaps-in-knowledge opened up by the importation 
of analytical categories such as gender into the 
Latin American context is not on account of the 
categories themselves, as it would be misleading to 
portray them as monolithic discursive domains 
rather than dynamic sites of negotiation and 
contestation, even within the feminisms they 
emerged from. More at stake here is how the 
multiplicitous nature of the historical structures of 
oppression that undergird the formation of 
interpretive categories in Latin America have a 
tendency to become under-theorized when the 
circulation of terms emanating from the north are 
privileged in transnational discourses.  
That said, one problem that can come out of 
critiquing such discourses and the interpretive 
categories privileged therein is the development of 
an account of Latin American women as suffering 
from a form of historical victimhood. As I see it, 
deeply diachronic approaches to social and political 
problems that affect women in Latin America 
(such as conditions of marginalization in 
communication) should not be seen as deflationary 
with regard to political praxis, or as privileging 
theoretical models of feminist inquiry over activist 
ones. What, one might ask, is the aim of pouring 
over conquest-era ethnographic records and 
administrative manuals, if the guiding concerns of 
our philosophic practice center around the lived-
experience and afflictions of modern-day women 
and marginalized, peripheral voices? The diversity 
of methodological perspectives of Latin American 
feminisms, taken together in an inclusive sense, not 
only address women’s lived concerns but help raise 
important questions about the adequacy of, for 
example, dominant Western conceptions of 
language and selfhood to do justice to the narrative 
life of multicultural and subaltern subjects—
subjects who often dwell in an understanding of 
things marked, not by continuity, but by 
discontinuity, rupture, and alterity.  
 
Beyond this, analyses such as the one I am offering 
should instill a deeper sense of the complicated 
factors involved in North-South dialogue, 
including an awareness of the difficult epistemic 
and interpretive labors marginalized subjects must 
often perform without any reciprocal 
acknowledgment of those efforts.  
 
In arguing for an epistemically inclusive, pluralist 
theoretical model for Latin American philosophical 
feminisms, I have been following Ofelia Schutte’s 
call to articulate a vision of  “Latin American 
feminist philosophy [that] can achieve its own 
distinct identity and stop being dependent for its 
articulation on paradigms of knowledge whose 
premises are not necessarily best attuned to 
understand the issues arising from its cultural 
location and contextual differences” (2011, 801).  
One important step towards this goal, I have 
argued, is to develop a more robust account of the 
historicality of oppression that often gets lost, or is 
subaudible within Anglophone and North 
American feminist discourses (and which I 
recognize, are themselves plural and complex). To 
this end, I have worked through issues of epistemic 
de-legitimation raised by the North American 
reception of Rigoberta Menchú’s testimonial 
narrative as a way of re-investing notions of 
cultural alterity as central to theorizing the 
historically complex multiplicity of oppressions 
that characterize Latin American feminisms. To 
avoid problems of fears over political paralysis, 
especially at a time when violence against women 
and human rights emergencies remain widespread, 
I have situated the history of European 
colonization within wider concerns about the 
marginalization of women’s voices in cross-cultural 
dialogue.  On this account, one can agree that, at a 
minimal level, addressing questions of oppression 
and marginalization often involves engaging in 
dialogue across North-South contexts. The 
problem is that such dialogue invariably involves 
negotiations nested within particular kinds of 
Western argumentative frameworks that, 
historically, have tended to disempower indigenous, 
non-Western speakers in general and women in 
particular. Thus, at the practical level, there are 
important historical issues that bear negatively on 
the ability of women and marginalized, indigenous 
communities to express their interests and/or 
advocate on their own behalf. In this respect, the 
historical roots of oppression cannot be 
disassociated from the inquiry of a critical Latin 
American feminist philosophy, since it is always 
present, even in the gaps between words. 
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